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First of all, I would like to thank the organizers for providing me with the opportunity to share my views on
the transition process in the Baltic States. Also, let me congratulate the authors and organizers of the
OECD study on The Baltic states with producing the analysis. It is a considerable input into the discussion
on economic reforms in these countries, including Lithuania.
I would like to structure my brief presentation by suggesting to you a number of statements, or
hypothesis, on the aspects of economic reforms, elaborating further some issues that are only mentioned
in the study.
Proposition 1. Transition to market economy has been to a large degree influenced and structured
by the other two parallel processes, namely globalisation and European integration.
What does this mean? First, the end of the Cold war for the Baltic States meant not only the freedom and
ability to choose the path towards a democratic society and the market economy; it also marked the end
of the division of the world into two competing blocks, and the beginning of the rapidly increasing
international flows of goods, capital, ideas and people facilitated by advancing technology. As the New
York Times journalist Thomas Friedman has noted with a dose of exaggeration, "The symbol of the Cold
war system was a wall, which divided everyone. The symbol of the globalisation system is the World Wide
Web, which unites everyone". Finally, it also meant the end of division of Europe and the integration of
the CEECs into the EU. The integration process for the Baltic States started in the first half of 1990s with
the Free trade agreements and Europe agreements being signed with the EU. Since then, integration has
been proceeding with as remarkable speed as the transition itself. Currently all three Baltic States are
negotiating the accession terms with the EU and implementing numerous bilateral and unilateral
integration measures.
Proposition 2. Globalisation, or increasing links between nation states, companies and
individuals, facilitates the transition to the market economy of the Baltic States and other
countries of this region by providing more opportunities to adopt the best practices of other
countries.
This OECD study itself is a good example of globalisation at work and exchange of ideas about reforms.
Globalisation facilitates the economic reforms and functioning of the markets in general by providing
capital, expertise, technology and other means that reduce transaction costs, increase efficiency and
provide the benefits of the open market to an increasingly larger share of population. Globalisation also
encourages external liberalization and the opening up of the reforming economies and facilitates trade
and the division of labour. At the same time, it does not seem to alter so far the economic fundamentals
such as the comparative advantages of the countries, but illustrates them in a world of decreasing relative
transportation and communication costs and increasing trade. As the OECD Study suggests, the Baltic
States illustrate very well the validity of the concept of comparative advantage. This should be stressed in
the background of intellectual climate in Lithuania which could be well characterised by the question that
was raised several years ago by world famous US economist Paul Krugman - "why don't intellectuals
understand comparative advantage?"
Proposition 3. Globalisation can limit the autonomy of economic policy but this in many cases
might be a factor that makes the governments more accountable, their policy more transparent
and economic competition more effective.
Globalisation has its set of rules that revolve around opening, deregulating and privatising your economy.
These processes are currently taking place not only in the transition countries, but also in most OECD
countries and other places of the globe. They reflect the prevailing consensus on the economic policy and
more efficient way of business both inside the countries and internationally. What is important is what
Thomas Friedman calls "the democratisation of technology", which enables more people to reach further
distances, faster and cheaper than before; "the democratisation of finance" which enables not only some
banks but many individuals to participate in the capital markets and hold the sovereign debts of many
countries; and "the democratisation of information" which shows us how ahead or behind we are in
comparison to the other reforming countries. These factors increase control over government policies,
making them more accountable to their people. At the same time, governments are punished more
severely for their inappropriate economic policy decisions and have stronger incentives to create more
favourable climate, whether regulatory or fiscal, for investments and business in general. In the Baltic
States, however, we are only starting to see these processes at work.
Proposition 4. Integration into the EU has structured the transition process in the Baltic States. It
has provided a time-frame and incentives for reforms through linking the progress in transition
reforms with the EU accession criteria.
Integration into the EU has exerted a positive impact on transition reforms in the Baltic States in a number
of ways. First, by signing the Free trade agreements and the Association agreements the Baltic state
have committed themselves to the liberalization of trade with the EU and implementation of some other
reforms such as competition policy within a clear timetable. Afterwards, these committments have many
times prevented the authorities in Lithuania from reintroducing barriers to trade. The goal of EU
membership has also acted as a major incentive for signing the main three trilateral trade agreements
between the Baltic States. In general, the EU accession, or "Copenhagen", criteria of the functioning
market economy and capacity to withstand competitive pressure within the EU have provided a
considerable push to continue economic reforms in the Baltic States. To some extent, the Progress
reports of the European Commission have reflected the progress of these countries not only in preparing
for EU accession negotiations and membership but also progress in transition reforms.
Proposition 5. Integration into the EU has impacted positively on the main elements of transition
reforms in the Baltic States - stabilization, liberalization, privatisation and institutional reforms.
The impact of integration on economic reforms in the Baltic countries has been both direct and indirect. It
had an indirect positive impact on stabilization by emphasising the importance of conditions for the stable
economic environment in the Agenda 2000 and regular reports. It had a direct positive impact on
liberalization by removing barriers to trade and encouraging economic cooperation in the region and
joining the WTO. It had an indirect positive impact on privatisation by encouraging continuing this
process. And it also had direct and indirect positive impact on creating the market institutions, for
example, by supporting establishment of financial institutions, reforms of the public finance system and
public administration.
Proposition 6. The impact of the further adoption of EU acquis communautaire, in particular the
norms regulating process standards such as environment or labour relations, on economic
growth in the Baltic states is uncertain.
One of the conditions for being admitted into the EU is the transposition and the implementation of the EU
acquis cummunautaire in the candidate country. This includes also the rules governing the Single market
and the common policies. During its half a century history, the EU has developed a vast body of norms
regulating the economic activities in the Single market, including quality standards of products and
production processes. As some experts (Baldwin, R., Francois, J., Portes, R.) have concluded, the acquis
is a sub-optimal choice of rules for the transition economies that are in different stages of economic
development. Therefore, in order to reduce uncertainty and possible investment needs, which might strain
the budget and put too large a regulatory pressure on enterprises, the authorities of these countries need
to have a clear and grounded strategy of acquis implementation. The acquis requiring significant
investments by the enterprises and state has to be implemented later. Further, there are two questions of
the impact of EU regulation. First, is its impact on the competitiveness of Lithuanian enterprises, because
the fast implementation of some EU norms might diminish their competitive advantages inside the Single
market? Second, there is an issue of the administrative ability of the regulatory institutions in the Baltic
States to observe the principles of proportionality of means to achieve the aims defined in the directives,
not to impose a disproportionate burden on enterprises, to implement the regulations properly and not to
be captured by interest groups. The credibility of properly implementing the EU membership requirements
in the context of transition is equally or even more important than the speed of integration.
Proposition 7. The linkages between transition, globalisation and integration make the argument
about the interdependency of transition reforms even stronger. The experience of the Russian
crisis in the Baltic States illustrates this point very well.
As the OECD Study confirms, all the variables are interdependent and reforms in all areas have to be
implemented in parallel. Otherwise for example, liberalization of trade without liberalizing and privatising
the infrastructure sectors or creating conditions for the financial institutions might not bring all the benefits
to the economy. The impact of the Russian crisis, being to some extent unavoidable due to intense trade
of the Baltic states with Russia have been aggravated by the legacy of incomplete structural reforms and
inadequate response of the state authorities. Were the sectors such as energy, agriculture, social
protection reformed and conditions for effective competition not distorted by soft budgetary constraints
and regulatory barriers, the adjustment of the economy to the external shock would have probably been
easier, although not without short-term costs. One should hope that this lesson has been learned and
there are indications of this.
